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Abstract
How were the most underprivileged women mobilized after suffrage? Newly enfran-
chised women faced a multitude of barriers to voting and this was especially the case
for working-class women. We theorize that working-class women were more likely to
acquire civic attitudes and information through ties with neighbors of the same class
than working-class men or privileged classes. Working-class women’s typical employ-
ment and domestic responsibilities provided the most opportunities, motivation and
need for local networks, while limiting the opportunities to acquire political resources
via outside employment or voluntary associations typically available to other social
groups. Utilizing an original dataset of individual voting records in a mid-sized indus-
trial city during interwar period in Sweden, we employ a difference-in-differences design
that isolates neighbor effects from confounders at the individual level. Consistent with
our argument, we find that class homogeneity of neighbors enhanced working-class
women’s turnout, but not that of privileged classes and working-class men.
Keywords: women’s suffrage, voting behavior, political development, democratization
1
We would like to thank various people for their advice and feedback including Ana
Catalano Weeks, Soledad Prillaman, Rachel Bernhard, Jeong Kim, Dawn Teele, Oyvind
Skorge, Diana O’Brian, Melanie Hughes, Carissa Tudor, Rosalind Shorrocks, Selina Hof-
stetter, Amanda Clayton, Tessa DiTonto, Malu Gatto, Nick Vyvian, Gidon Cohen, Patrick
Khun, Julie Novkov, Drude Dahlerup, Monique Leyenaar, Lenita Freidenvall, and partici-
pants at seminars at the LSE, Newcastle University, and at EGEN, ECPG, PSA and APSA
conferences. Please send any comments at mona.morgan-collins@durham.ac.uk. Replication
files can be found at (Morgan-Collins, Mona and Grace Natusch 2021).
While suffrage provides de jure access to the polls, it does not guarantee de facto electoral
participation of previously disenfranchised groups. Given that groups barred from suffrage
tend to be socially and economically marginalized, newly enfranchised electorates are likely
to struggle taking advantage of their new political rights (see Corder and Wolbrecht 2006,
2016; Kim 2017 on women). Indeed, while women’s suffrage cut a sharp end to the exclusion
of women from the public sphere, it did not immediately challenge the gendered character of
work and family that limited women’s access to education, resourceful employment outside
the home and associated networks. This was especially the case for working-class women, who
faced the most severe obstacles to political resources. So how did the most underprivileged
group among newly enfranchised women overcome ‘double barrier’ of their class and gender
and secure de facto political voice after suffrage?
Despite repeated calls for intersectional approaches in democratization scholarship (Car-
away 2004; Baldez 2010, p.202), the exploration of early women’s voting behavior by another
category has been limited by a virtual lack of individual-level data. In this research, we rise
to this challenge by taking advantage of unique data from electoral registers in a mid-sized
industrial city in Sweden. This individual-level data allows us to apply intersectional lens to
the study of women’s turnout immediately after suffrage expansion.
Through the analysis of our original dataset, we propose a class-specific pathway from
de jure to de facto inclusion of women in the public sphere: local networks. We argue
that newly enfranchised working-class women at the turn of the twentieth century assessed
political resources through social ties with neighbors to a greater extent than working-class
men or privileged classes. Social and institutional barriers to women’s outside employment,
combined with caring responsibilities at home without access to private childcare, meant
that working-class women’s typical economic, social and political engagements were more
often local. In turn, working-class women’s opportunities to develop civic skills and to
acquire political information through outside employment or voluntary associations were
more limited than that of working-class men and privileged classes. Working-class men had
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better opportunities to access political resources through outside employment and associated
networks such as unions than working-class women. Upper and middle-class women could
rely on political resources associated with their privileged class or access resources through
voluntary associations.
Classic neighborhood studies demonstrate how the opportunity to forge social ties with
neighbors fosters propensity to vote (e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Cho, Gimpel and
Dyck 2006; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2012; Johnston et al 2005; McClurg 2006). Being sur-
rounded by those who are ‘alike’ is theorized to induce political conformity and to ease
information flows (Mutz 2002; Sinclair 2013), both of which fosters political participation.
However, scholars do not sufficiently explore the theoretical conditions that underpin the the-
orized effects and therefore mostly fail to explore heterogeneity of ‘neighbor effects’ across
social groups. Specifically, classic neighborhood studies rarely conceptually differentiate be-
tween ‘living nearby’ and ‘politically interacting’ with neighbors and between shared ‘social’
and ‘political’ identity of neighbors. Yet unless neighbors typically interact with one an-
other, and unless the shared social identity of interacting neighbors is sufficiently politicized,
living in a socially homogeneous locality may not increase turnout. We argue that once the
propensity to foster social ties with neighbors and the propensity of social identity to become
politicized is taken into account, being surrounded by neighbors who are ‘alike’ may induce
the propensity to vote of some social groups more than others. We argue that neighbor-
effects should be more pronounced among newly enfranchised working-class women at the
turn of the twentieth century than for other social groups.
In order to probe whether working-class women’s opportunities and motivation to forge
local ties with neighbors of their class fostered their turnout more than working-class men
and privileged classes, we generate an original dataset of about 5,000 individual voting
records from electoral registers in a single Swedish city of Södertälje between 1921 and 1934.
Collecting individual level data of such quality and detail is not feasible for large populations,
which naturally limits the geographical scope of our study in exchange for an intersectional
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approach to early women’s voting. To address the issues implied by such trade-offs, we
therefore devote special attention to case selection and generalizability. The character of
a fairly typical industrializing mid-sized city provides a good testing ground: even though
spatial proximity of neighbors is higher, it is a tough test given the city’s high mobility,
employment heterogeneity and opportunities for social ties with non-neighbors. In addition,
understanding the historical pathways to the success of women’s political mobilization in
Sweden seems important, especially given that Sweden did not stand out in terms of women’s
employment or industrialization at the turn of the twentieth century (Figure A17).
Utilizing our original individual-level dataset, we apply a cross-sectional difference-in-
differences approach that allows us to isolate neighbor effects from individual confounders.
As theorized, we find that working-class women were more likely to vote if surrounded by
working-class neighbors than working-class women surrounded by mixed-class neighbors.
In turn, we find that women and men of privileged classes and working-class men did not
respond to class composition of neighbors. Testing the proposed mechanisms, we suggest that
working-class women’s social conformity to local norms and access to political information
helped to drive the observed ‘neighbor effects’. Taking advantage of unique census data
from 1928, we then provide ecological evidence that our findings are generalizable beyond
Södertälje to all Swedish towns and that our theoretical framework can explain observed
patterns in rural settings.
This paper has important implications for women’s representation. While scholars focus
on de jure inclusion of women, such as inclusive quotas, power-sharing arrangements and
party organizations (e.g. Folke and Rickne 2016; Hughes 2011; Kittilson and Schwindt-
Bayer 2010), we suggests that de facto inclusion of women is equally important. Uncovering
how the most underprivileged group among newly enfranchised women mobilized seems
paramount to our understanding of how social inequalities may limit de facto inclusion of
the most underprivileged groups even under de jure inclusive institutions.
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Where We Are: Explaining Turnout of Newly Enfran-
chised Women
Recent research demonstrates how inclusive context fostered turnout of early women voters.
Skorge (forth.) documents how introduction of a proportional electoral system in Norway
enhanced politicians’ incentives to mobilize women and therefore increased their relative
turnout to men. In turn, Kim (2017) argues that direct democracy at the local level in Sweden
increased women’s sense of efficacy and therefore their turnout. On the other hand, Corder
and Wolbrecht (2006) find that barriers to voting, such as poll taxes or strict registration
requirements, affected women more than men. In addition, Corder and Wolbrecht (2016)
show that newly enfranchised women were more likely to vote relative to men in highly
competitive states. Despite the immense merits of demonstrating the robust impact of
contextual factors for early women’s turnout, these studies cannot explain why some women
were more likely to vote within the same institutional context.
In turn, scholars of women’s post-war political participation demonstrate the importance
of civic institutions, such as education and outside employment (e.g. Burns, Schlozman
and Verba 2001; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p.160). Civic
institutions encourage women’s turnout by providing vital political resources, such as better
information, independent income, and by helping to cultivate civic skills, social networks, or
even gender consciousness. However, it is not clear to what extent education and associated
employment can comprehensively explain turnout of women at the turn of the twentieth
century. After World War II, the increase in women’s employment reflected entry of married
women to clerical and public sector jobs that provided ample political resources. Before
the war, most married women faced formal and informal barriers to outside employment.
In addition, most jobs available to women seeking employment, such as domestic service,
casual work, domestic manufacturing or work in family enterprises, did not require extensive
education, were not unionized and often did not provide independent income or access to
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networks outside of one’s community (Costa 2000; Kessler-Harris 2007; Stanfors 2003).
Given women’s barriers to outside employment, political development scholars identify
alternative pathway to political resources for women at the turn of the twentieth century:
voluntary networks. Carpenter and Moore (2014) argue that women’s anti-slavery canvass-
ing provided organizational experience and networks to women that enhanced their future
political mobilization. Indeed, Carpenter et al 2018 finds that women’s turnout after the
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment was higher in states with greater pre-suffrage
petitioning for the vote. In turn, Morgan-Collins (2021) argues that American suffragists
helped to generate group consciousness and provided information that enabled women not
only to mobilize, but also to coordinate electorally on progressive issues. However, women’s
engagement in organized activities or voluntary associations was mostly an experience of
privileged women (Evans 2012, p.144-5). While some working-class women participated in
working-class associations or took part in civic activities, their opportunities to do so were
more limited, often reflecting gendered responsibilities at home without access to private
childcare.
Despite the recent advances in our understanding of the roots of women’s political par-
ticipation, it therefore remains to be explained how did the most underprivileged of newly
enfranchised women access information and develop civic skills that enabled them to take
advantage of their newly gained right to vote.
Theoretical Framework: Mobilization Through Social Ties
with Neighbors
We argue that newly enfranchised working-class women at the turn of the twentieth century
were mobilized through local networks to a greater extent than working-class men or priv-
ileged classes. Drawing on classic accounts that highlight the importance of local networks
for political participation, we expect that working-class women were more likely to vote
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when surrounded by working-class neighbors and that such effects were more pronounced for
working-class women than for working-class men or privileged classes. We argue that this
reflects working-class women’s stronger motivation and opportunity to interact with neigh-
bors and working-class women’s stronger politicization of working-class identity, not that
of women workers. In the reminder of this section, we discuss why motivation to interact
with neighbors may determine that only some social groups are responsive to local context
and why politicization of shared identity among neighbors may determine that only some
identities drive such responsiveness.
Social Interaction: Which Social Groups Forge Ties with Neighbors?
We expect working-class women’s turnout to be more responsive to social composition of
their neighbors than that of working-class men and privileged women because working-class
women were more likely to forge ties with neighbors. We argue that this is because social
composition of neighbors affects turnout only for social groups who typically interact with
neighbors.
Classic neighbor studies suggest that having neighbors who are ‘alike’ encourages mo-
bilization and identify two main channels through which mobilization occurs: political con-
formity and political information. However, both channels implicitly assume that social
homogeneity of neighbors increases mobilization only if it provides greater opportunity for
interactions with those ‘alike’. Frequent interactions with neighbors who are ‘alike’ induce
conformity to the groups’ civic norms through strengthening group identity (Postmes and
Branscombe 2002) or social pressure (Mutz 2002). In addition, frequent interactions with
neighbors who are ‘alike’ improve information flows between neighbors, or through exchanges
with a local opinion leaders and informed local canvassers (Sinclair 2013; Mutz 2002). This
secondary mobilization is also especially valuable to canvassers, who have an incentive to
target well-networked individuals (Fraga 2018, p.79-80; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p.24-
9).
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While the importance of social interaction for ‘neighbor effects’ has been recognized,
most ‘neighbor’ studies do not conceptually differentiate between ‘living’ in close proximity
to neighbors who are ‘alike’ and ‘interacting’ with neighbors who are ‘alike’. Yet unless
neighbors look to one another for political interaction, conformity is unlikely to be enforced
and information unlikely to be transmitted. For example, professionals may mostly forge
political networks with other professionals in outside employment or a union, while having
much weaker incentives to forge such ties with their neighbors. On the other hand, those
without outside employment or those employed locally have an incentive to cultivate ties
with neighbors - the only network readily available to them. Indeed, urban sociologists often
point to the persistent importance of neighbor ties among women and low income groups that
otherwise have fewer opportunities for outside relations (e.g. Henning and Lieberg 1996 on
Sweden; Völker, Flap and Lindenberg 2007 on the Netherlands). In political science, Fuchs
(1955) has directly linked limited social networks of American Jewish women outside of their
neighborhood to their voting behaviour. The failure to account for neighbors’ likelihood
of political interactions may explain why mobilization appeals do not always spillover to
neighbors (Sinclair 2012, ch.2), or why young people do not respond to voting propensity of
their neighbors (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2012).
At the turn of the twentieth century, working-class women had the strongest opportunity
and motivation to interact with neighbors. Despite the changing social and economic status
of women that accompanied the first wave of suffrage, women’s role as mothers and wives
continued being socially and institutionally supported (Kessler-Harris 2007, p.15). Formal
employment outside the home, especially for married women, was discouraged through joint
taxation, marriage bars, wage discrimination and occupational segregation (Costa 2000).
At the same time, some upper and middle-class women had access to elite education and
resources that enabled them to combine child rearing with activities in civic associations
or even high status professions. Single working-class women who were employed outside
the home, were often in non-unionized, socially isolating jobs, such as domestic service,
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while married working-class women who were in need of independent income often sought
local employment compatible with family responsibilities, such as casual work, domestic
manufacturing, or work in family businesses and farms (Costa 2000).
Identity Politicization: Which Social Identity is Politicized?
We expect working-class women’s turnout to respond to the proportion of workers among
neighbors, not the proportion of women workers among neighbors. We argue that this is
because social composition of neighbors affects political participation only if the majority
social identity is sufficiently politicized.
Classic neighbor studies suggest that having neighbors who are ‘alike’ encourages mobi-
lization of members of the majority group. However, these studies implicitly assume that
the shared social identity is sufficiently politicized. Political conformity and political infor-
mation induces turnout among the majority members because the group internalizes a sense
of shared belonging, or shares material or symbolic grievances (Huddy 2013). Shared group
identity is also valuable to organized interests and politicians who have an incentive to define
the group’s shared issues and to mobilize the group on those shared issues (Morgan-Collins
2021; Valenzuela and Michelson 2016).
While the importance of shared politicized identity for ‘neighbor effects’ has been recog-
nized, most ‘neighbor studies’ do not conceptually differentiate between ‘social’ and ‘political’
identity. Yet unless neighbors have a shared political identity, interacting with neighbors will
not induce mobilization along this shared identity. For example, those sharing marital status
characteristics may identify as ‘married’, but political salience of being married is likely to
be weak and therefore unlikely to enhance shared political behavior of the group. On the
other hand, individuals who share a working-class identity that is highly politically salient
will respond to whether their neighbors are also working-class. The failure to account for
the strength of politicization of the shared identity may explain why the strength of neigh-
bor effects varies with respect to class and religion (Foladare 1968), or why there are no
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mobilization spillover effects to neighbors without taking into account their socio-economic
status (Sinclair 2012, ch.2).
At the turn of the twentieth century, class identity alone was more strongly politicized
than class-gender identity for working-class women. Organized women’s groups, especially
suffragists, contributed to the politicization of women’s shared identity by defining women’s
issues and pressing politicians to respond accordingly (Morgan-Collins 2021). However, most
early women’s movements were essentially middle-class in terms of their membership and
agenda (Evans 1977, p.144-5). This may at least partly reflect the fact that working-class
women faced a double barrier of both class and gender, of which class was more strongly
politicized and linked to immediate, material interests. Even though working-class women
organized in separate women’s working-class associations, their participation was often lim-
ited due to women’s weak employment outside the home, weak unionization and gendered
commitments at home without access to private childcare (Kessler-Harris 2007, ch.1). So-
cial interactions with working-class neighbors and local opinion leaders would have therefore
been more likely to encourage working-class women to adopt the identity of workers, not
that of working-class women.
Swedish Women in Context: Labour Force and Voluntary Associations
In this section, we discuss how our argument fits with the historical context of early women
voters in Sweden. We focus on women’s labour force and voluntary associations to demon-
strate how class shaped women’s access to local networks.
Women’s Labour Force At the turn of the twentieth century, Sweden did not stand
out internationally with respect to women’s employment. Family policies sought to bring
functionally divided family model to the working-class, employers were allowed to dismiss
women workers upon marriage until 1938, maternity leave was not introduced until 1937,
government subsidized childcare was not established until 1943 and joint household taxation
favored one-earner household until the 1970s (Haavet 2006; Stanfors 2003, p.82-7). The
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incentives for women to work outside the home were further hindered by wage discrimination,
occupational sex-segregation and educational disparities between women and men. The
average hourly wage of female blue collar worker was nearly half of the corresponding male
wage (Svensson 2004, p.204-6). Over 25% of gainfully employed women were in domestic
service, 30% in agriculture and 20% in industry, compared to 40% of men in agriculture and
another 40% in industry.
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Work in domestic service, however, was undervalued, unregulated
and deprived women of the opportunity to forge collegial social ties (Svensson 2004, p.210).
Until state financed secondary schools opened up to girls in 1927, girls were only required
to attend elementary school, although girls of wealthy families were educated in private
secondary schools (Stanfors 2003, p.73, 146-7).
Without policies supporting a dual-earner model, motherhood thus provided institutional
and logistical barriers to outside work especially for working-class women who did not have
access to private childcare. Consequently, full-time work outside the home that generated
independent income was typically an isolated part of women’s life course even for working-
class women. Single working-class women were expected to exit the labour market upon
marriage, while married working-class women were mostly marginal workers who worked at
times of economic need or high demand for labour (Stanfors 2003, p.10,82). In 1920, only
about a third of Swedish women above 15 years old were gainfully employed outside the
home, of which less than 5% were married (Åmark 2006). While these statistics underes-
timate the total amount of women’s labour, they reflect women’s weaker participation in
labour force outside the home. Woman’s labour that is not accounted in these statistics
mostly includes women’s unremunerated, informal or part-time work in the home, such as in
domestic manufacturing, family enterprises or other casual work (Stanfors 2003; Vikström
2003).
Women’s Voluntary Associations Swedish upper and middle-class women came to
dominate charitable and philanthropic organizations in the second half of the nineteenth
2
Statistisk Årsbok för Sverige 1930, Table 23, p.20.
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century (Lundström 1996). Women’s engagement in charitable organizations and local poor
relief boards reflected ‘women’s solicitude’ (Sjögren 2012), but also the ability of privileged
women to devote time and effort to voluntary activities outside the home. Privileged women
could rely on servants and private kindergartens, while childcare for working-class women
only operated on a charity basis (Stanfors 2003, p.87). It is therefore not surprising that the
first women’s organizations drew on privileged women’s experience in philanthropy, leaving
middle-class women as the main component of the National Suffrage Society (LKPR) (Blom
2012; Florin 2009). While the LKPR sought to maintain a cross class alliance (Sainsbury
2001), disagreements between working-class and privileged women were common (Evans
1977, p.147).
By 1920, separate Social Democratic Women’s Association united 120 local clubs that
were predominantly concerned with economic vulnerability of single mothers and working
conditions of women.
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However, most working-class women who worked outside the home
were not organized in neither the clubs nor the unions. Significant proportion of working
women were employed in domestic service, domestic manufacturing and in family enterprises,
all of which limited opportunities for unionization. In turn, women in industrial jobs were
often single and expected to leave upon marriage, which discouraged any organized activities.
In addition, the position of unions towards women was ambivalent, balancing class unity with
the protection of men’s jobs. For example, while the industrial Textile Worker’s Union was
equally successful in the unionization of both sexes, the craft’s Tailoring Worker’s Union
initially discouraged women’s labour and opposed the inclusion of women dominated trades
(Uppenberg 2012). In the end, only about 10% of all members of Trade Union Confederacy
in 1920 were women (Uppenberg 2012).
3
S-women’s official website, www.s-kvinnor.se, accessed April 2020.
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Case Selection
After carefully mapping data availability,
4
we collect data to probe working-class women’s
responsiveness to the class composition of their neighbors in a city district Södertälje East,
which covers about half of Södertälje (map in Figure A1a), the second largest city in the
Stockhom county. Södertälje started industrializing in the 1890s, doubling its population
over the next three decades (Nordström 1968, p.779-842). By 1910, only about 5% of workers
were employed in the agricultural sector (Table A1). The city produced a variety of indus-
trial products, from gas mantles by AB Keros and trolleys by Scania-Vabis, to bear, soda,
matches, wooden boxes, wall tiles and fur hats (Nordström 1968, p.766-776). Predictably,
industrialization was accompanied by economic hardship, repeated lockouts and a range of
social issues (Nordström 1968, p.779-842). In the 1921 parliamentary elections Socialists re-
ceived nearly ten percentage points more votes (46%) than in the rest of Sweden (Table A1).
While men’s turnout in Södertälje was four percentage points below the national average,
women’s turnout was seven percentage points above national average (Table A1). These
patterns of women’s turnout were typical in early twentieth century cities (Tingsten 1937)
and across Swedish cities at the time of suffrage.
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The urban character of a fairly typical mid-sized industrializing Södertälje provides a good
testing ground for our theoretical framework. (i) Södertälje offers a ‘tough’ test. If local
4
Local electoral registers survived in about half of municipalities for at least some elections
between 1910-1940 in Stockholm county. About 10% of local archives did not respond to
our requests.
5
One concern here is whether our results are generalizable to cities with lower women’s
turnout. Somewhat reassuring is the fact that we estimate neighbor effects of similar size
in all three sampled elections despite each election having different levels of overall turnout
and the gender turnout gap and that our results appear generalizable to all Swedish cities
in 1928 (Figure 5).
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networks mobilize early working-class women voters in an industrializing urban setting where
geographical mobility, employment heterogeneity and opportunities for social ties outside
one’s neighbors are high in general, we should expect local networks to play a significant
role elsewhere in the country. (ii) Södertälje provides a ‘typical urban’ setting. The variety
of industries in the city, together with its mid-sized character, makes it more likely that our
results generalize to other cities in Sweden. (iii) Södertälje offers good level of geographical
closeness to neighbors. A detailed contemporary map suggests that Södertälje East was
densely populated throughout the city, with fairly spaced properties on similar-sized plots
(map in Figure A1b).
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We collect electoral registers for the city’s local elections in two municipal (1921 and 1934)
and one county election (1921) that span over a decade after suffrage.
7
Local elections at the
turn of the twentieth century typically had lower turnout, especially among women (Tingsten
1937).
8
Local elections thus provide the ‘least favorable’ context for newly enfranchised
women to successfully mobilize and allow us to explore why some working-class women
are more likely to vote than others.
9
Given that local elections in Södertälje had a single
6
One central neighborhood, St. Ragnhild, has more closely packed upper & middle class
town houses (see also Figure A2). However, our results are not driven by a single neighbor-
hood (Figure A10).
7
Most women voted for the first time in 1919 (municipal) and 1921 (parliamentary).
Before 1919, very few women who paid taxed or owned property were eligible and voted
(Sjögren 2012).
8
This was also the case in Södertälje in 1921 (see Tables A1 & A6).
9
One concern here is that our results from local elections may not generalize to parlia-
mentary elections. Somewhat reassuring is the fact that we find neighbor effects of similar
magnitude in all three sampled elections despite very different turnout levels (Figure 3)
and that our results appear to generalize to parliamentary elections in other Swedish cities
(Figure 5).
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election district, every elector in our dataset is exposed to the same city-level campaign
and candidates. The wide time span between the two election years in our data set allows
us to explore whether neighbor effects vary over time. The sample also allows probing
generalizability across two types of local elections (municipal and regional) under two types
of calendars (general and off-year elections). Table 1 summarizes the election sample.
Table 1: Sampled Elections
Election Year Calendar City District County
Municipal 1921 General Södertälje East Stockholm
County 1921 General Södertälje East Stockholm
Municipal 1934 Off-year Södertälje East Stockholm
Data & Variables
The dataset consists of individual level data from electoral registers that list all age-eligible
electors in Södertälje East, whether they met eligibility criteria
10
and whether they voted in
each election. The electoral registers also give information on sex, year of birth, occupation,
and an address that indicates one’s property and a larger neighborhood. Taking advantage
of the fact that families who live together share the same last name in a property
11
, and the
fact that wives are consistently entered in the registers below their husbands, we also recover
10
The right to vote was denied to about 5% individuals in our dataset for being on poor
relief, in prison, incapacitated, declaring bankruptcy or for not paying local taxes (Sjögren
2012).
11
One concern here is that we code two or more unrelated families with the same last name
living in the same property as a single family unit. In our data set, about 7% of age-eligible
electors live in a property with more than one wife, but may or may not share last name
because of family ties. Even though some of these households are genuinely related (e.g.
brother and sister), our results are robust to assuming that all multi-wife families are not
related (Figure A8).
14
information on family units within the household and marital status.
12
As shown in Table
2, the 1921 dataset covers 4307 age-eligible individuals listed on electoral registers, that is
2398 families in 518 properties. Between 1921 and 1934, the city district has grown and the
number of electors increased by 16.6% while the number of properties increased by 35.5%.
Each property typically consists of four families and each family typically has two electors.
About 5% of age-eligible electors live in properties that house more than 27 or 23 electors in
1921 and 1934 respectively. About 5% of properties consist of more than 14 or 12 families in
1921 and 1934 respectively. In the reminder of the section, we discuss measurement of key
variables: class, class composition and turnout.
Table 2: Data Structure: Properties, Families and Electors.
1921 1934
# Properties 518 702
Electors per property (mean) 8.3 (8.4) 7.2 (8.6)
# Families 2,398 2,599
Families per property (mean) 4.6 (4.8) 3.7 (4.8)
# Electors 4307 5023
Electors per family (mean) 1.8 (1.0) 1.9 (1.1)
Notes: Std. dev. in parentheses.
Class Using data on occupation in the registers, combined with occupation classifica-
tion in the 1910 census, we assign each occupation into one of three categories: (i) upper
class consisting of owners (land, farm, building, factory), (ii) middle-class consisting of white
collar occupations in the public sector and service, professionals, merchants and small hold-
ers, and (iii) working-class consisting of blue collar manual jobs in industry, agriculture,
transport, service and domestic service.
13
By using occupation rather than income for class
12
For example, a family that consists of a husband, wife and an age-eligible unmarried
daughter shares the same last name. If this family employs domestic servants who reside on
the property, each family of servants then constitutes a separate family within the property.
13
We follow classification of working-class occupations in the 1910 census. We list all
occupations by class in Tables A3-5.
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categorization, we therefore consider class as both economic and social concept. That is,
while ownership status and income is taken into account as an objective-economic compo-
nent, subjective-status component of class is also considered. As we argue in the theory
section, a sense of (social and economic) ‘similarity’ facilitates the development of neigh-
bor ties. This implies that even if some white collar workers, such as clerks, may earn the
same income as some blue collar skilled workers, such as tradesman, the former has a higher
social status. This also implies that agricultural workers are considered working-class, as
they are more similar to industrial workers in terms of earnings and social status than to
any other class.
14
Both implications are consistent with the contemporary classification of
working-class occupations in the 1910 census.
The most severe limitation of the occupation data is that women’s gainful employment is
overridden by their civil status and therefore only available for unmarried women. Occupa-
tion of formally ‘dependent’ women is listed as ‘wife’, ‘daughter’ or ‘widow’. Some formally
‘dependent’ women may therefore still be employed. We make two coding decisions in this re-
spect. First, we assume that married women’s class is largely determined by their husbands,
and classify all married women based on their husband’s occupation. Given the contempo-
rary listing of wives as ‘dependents’, this assumption seems more plausible at the turn of the
twentieth century than in more recent periods.
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‘Wives’ are the most common ‘occupation’
14
While agricultural workers were mostly mobilized through separate channels and earned
less on average than industrial workers, a similar difference can be found between unionized
and non-unionized industrial workers. Note, too, that only about 0.6% (1.1%) of all electors
classified as agricultural workers in 1921 (1934) in our data set.
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Our coding will nonetheless introduce some noise at the individual level. Some ‘wives’
of blue-collar husbands, for example, may own inherited property, or may be white-collar
workers, such as school teachers. However, our main results for married women is similar
to a result for single women whose occupation is known (Figure A11). Importantly, using a
household-level indicator of class is less of a concern in our study, which links property-level
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category for women (54%), and the occupation of their husbands’ is easily determined given
that they are always listed below husbands.
16
Second, we classify all other formally ‘depen-
dent’ women (daughters and widows) as a separate category of unclassified ‘dependents’
17
In
contrast to ‘wives’ we cannot easily determine the class of ‘daughters’ (2.6% of all women)
as they are not systematically listed below fathers in the registers. The classification of ‘wid-
ows’ (11% of all women) is similarly challenging given that their deceased husbands do not
appear in the registers.
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Overall, we are able to assign over 93% of age-eligible electors into
one of the four class categories.
19
Among the eligible electors in the 1921 registers, 68% are
working-class, 20% middle-class, 2% upper class and 10% formally ‘dependent’. Electoral
registers in 1934 return nearly identical distribution (Table A2).
Class Composition To proxy the size of one’s in-group neighbors, we prefer to combine
(not individual) class composition to individual voting propensity.
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We nonetheless capture class heterogeneity within family units beyond that of wives.
That is, a son of a white-collar profession who lives in a blue-collar parental home is coded
as middle-class living in a working-class family. This allows us to better proxy one’s likelihood
of forming local ties. A white-collar son may be more likely to establish politicized social
networks with other white-collar professionals outside his blue-collar neighbors.
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Few men were also classified as ‘son’ (N=19) or ‘student’ (N=16), and those are also
coded as ‘dependents’. While some men whose occupation is listed as ‘son’ may also work
outside the home, the registers regularly list an actual occupation of live-in sons in most
cases.
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While some ‘dependents’ may have worked outside home, others may have worked in-
formally or at home, or not worked at all. While there are relatively few ‘daughters’, not
knowing the class of widows inevitably introduces noise. Somewhat reassuring is that our
results are similar for both married and unmarried working-class women (Figure A11).
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About 7% remains unclassified due to (i) missing occupation, (ii) unclear occupation
(e.g. assistant) or (iii) unclear abbreviation of the occupation.
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upper and middle-class categories into a single category that refers to a single non-working-
class, that is those in non-manual jobs.
20
We measure the size of one’s in-group as the
proportion of in-group neighbors living in the same property. The rationale here is to capture
the smallest geographical unit, property, with the most regular social interactions.
21
Note
that, by definition, properties with a single family do not have neighbors in a property
and therefore are not considered in the models.
22
The measure also considers only electors
with a known class (worker, middle or upper). That is, the proportion of working-class
neighbors in a property is calculated as the total number of known workers among neighbors




Note that only about 2% of electors are classified as upper class, preventing us to consider
upper and middle classes separately. Models for middle class only return similar results to
combining upper and middle class (Figure A7).
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While social ties are likely to form with both neighbors in one’s property, and neigh-
bors in a nearby property, we expect geographical proximity to be positively related to the
propensity of neighbor ties. If anything, restricting the analysis to property-neighbors may
underestimate overall neighbor effects.
22
About 26% and 32% of families lived in a single-family property in 1921 and 1934 re-
spectively, but single-family properties housed only about 7.4% and 11.6% of electors in 1921
and 1934 respectively. One concern is that excluding single-family properties introduces bias.
However, single and multi-family properties have a similar age, sex, and class composition
(Table A8). While single family properties have a higher proportion of married electors (Ta-
ble A8), somewhat reassuring is that our results are similar for single and married women
(Figure A11).
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This leaves out about 10% of electors classified as ‘dependent’ and about 7% of electors
who could not be categorized into either of the four class categories. However, our results
are robust to using total number of all (known and unknown) electors in the denominator
(Figure A6). In addition, the proportion of ‘dependents’ among all property electors does not
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our indicator is that class composition of neighbors may be related to the number of electors
in a property. This is not the case in 1921 (Figure A4a,b). In 1934, properties with a larger
number of electors have fewer workers and more upper and middle class electors (Figure
A4c,d). However, this seems to be mostly driven by the very largest properties. Somewhat
reassuring is the fact that our results are robust to excluding these large properties (Figure
A9).
The proportion of one’s in-group property-neighbors varies substantially (Figure 1).
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While most workers had more than half of neighbors who are also workers, about 40% of
workers lived in properties that were occupied only by workers (Figure 1a). Properties with
100% upper and middle-class electors were not very common, and about a third of upper
and middle-class electors had more than half of neighbors who were also upper or middle
class (Figure 1b). The ‘mixed’ class living reflects several factors: (i) owners living in own
apartment buildings, (ii) upper and middle-class families employing domestic workers who
reside on the property, and (iii) some middle-class families living in the same properties as
some skilled working-class families.
Turnout Turnout varies by elections, from over 44% and 39% in the 1921 municipal and
county elections, to less than 18% in the off-year 1934 municipal elections (Table A6). In
all three elections, women voted less often than men, but the gender turnout gap ‘shrinks’
over time from about 15 and 12 percentage points (pp) difference between women and men
in the 1921 elections respectively, to slightly over 2pp in the 1934 election (Table A6). In
all three elections, workers voted less often than upper and middle-class. However, the gap
between turnout of workers and non-workers remained at 15, 10 and 11pp across the three
vary with our measure of class composition (Figure A12). This suggests that ‘dependents’
are a truly heterogeneous group made up of all classes.
24
The proportion of in-group neighbors does not vary noticeably across the seven neigh-
borhoods (Figure A2). This suggests relatively weak geographical clustering by class at the
neighborhood level.
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Figure 1: Class Composition of Neighbors
(a) Working-class (b) Upper and middle-class
Note: Darker (lighter) color refers to 1921 (1934), single family properties excluded.
election respectively (Table A6). In 1921, the difference in turnout between women and men
was most pronounced among working-class women (Figure 2a,b). By 1934, the difference in
turnout between women and men narrowed to few percentage points for both workers and
non-workers (Figure 2c). In all elections, electors classified as ‘dependents’, mostly consisting
of widows, voted the least often.
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Figure 2: Turnout by Gender, Class & Election in Södertälje
(a) Municipal Election 1921 (b) County Election 1921 (c) Municipal Election 1934
Notes: First bar (lighter) indicates women’s turnout, second bar (darker) indicates men’s
turnout; ‘UpMid’ refers to a combined upper and middle class, ‘Work’ to working-class, ‘Dep’
to unclassified dependents; only age-eligible electors who retained their right to vote included;
about 23% of electors were upper & middle class, 68% working class and 9% dependents in
1921; tile graph showing relative size of each demographic group in Figure A3.
Empirical Strategy
Identifying ‘neighbor effects’ is not an easy task, given that similar ‘types’ of voters tend to
live in geographic proximity. That is, a worker living in a majority middle-class property
is most likely different from a worker who lives in a majority working-class property. For
example, one can imagine that workers living in working-class properties are more likely to
be poorer and/or to work in a factory than workers living in middle-class properties. In this
case, comparing turnout of workers living in middle-class properties to turnout of workers
living in working-class properties will be confounded by the type of jobs and income levels of
the workers living in each property. The crux of identifying ‘neighbor effects’ is thus the fact
that comparing individuals across properties is unlikely to separate neighbor effects from
individual-level confounders.
In tackling this problem, we apply solution proposed by Barber and Imai (2015).
25
Rather
than comparing electors across properties, we compare electors within properties. In other
25
See Amat et al (2020) for a recent application.
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words, we first compare turnout of workers and non-workers within each property and then
estimate whether this within-property difference varies with property-level class composi-
tion. This allows us to control for observed and unobserved characteristics shared by all
electors (workers and non-workers) living in the same property. In other words, by compar-
ing working-class and middle-class electors within the same property, we can better isolate
neighbor effects from individual-level confounders.
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In order to identify neighbor effects, we estimate a linear probability model with property
fixed effects. The linear fixed effect model operationalizes the identification strategy, where
the property fixed effects allow within-property comparison. The advantage of using linear
probability models in our case is a relatively straightforward interpretation of the estimates
and handling of the property fixed effects.
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Very reassuring is the fact that logistic regression
returns similar estimates (Figure A13). Specifically, we estimate average neighbor effects for
workers (non-workers) with the following general form:
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Eliminating property-level confounders does not mitigate the possibility of individual-
level bias within the same property. For example, workers and non-workers in the same
property may still be different in other aspects than their class. However, given that prop-
erties are very small units, it seems likely that electors in a single property would be fairly
homogeneous (Barber and Imai 2005). Somewhat reassuring is also the fact that workers
and non-workers are similar on average in terms of their likelihood to be female, getting
married and their age (Table A7).
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While the mathematically correct specification would use a curvature function to model
our binary outcome, linear probability models often provide good approximation of the
estimates. Logistic regression cannot estimate coefficients and standard errors for covariates
that predict success or failure perfectly. In our case, this means that properties where all
electors voted or none voted are dropped from the analysis. This results in a loss of about
18% of observations and about 36% of properties in the 1921 municipal elections.
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Yi = ↵p +  Groupi +  Groupi ∗NeighborGroupp[i] + "i
where Yi refers to individual level turnout and ↵p refers to property fixed effects. In
models that estimate average neighbor effects for working-class women and men, Groupi
refers to a dummy variable indicating a working-class elector and NeighborGroupp[i] refers
a to the proportion of working-class neighbors in property p for worker i. In models that
estimate average neighbor effects for upper and middle-class women and men, Groupi refers
to a dummy variable indicating an upper and middle-class elector and NeighborGroupp[i]
refers to the proportion of upper and middle-class neighbors in property p for upper and
middle class elector i. The effect of interest is captured by  , which estimates how the
proportion of in-group electors among one’s neighbors affects one’s turnout. Note that by
including property fixed effects ↵p , we do not estimate full interaction between Groupi
and NeighborGroupp[i]. Omitting the main effect on NeighborGroupp[i] reparametrizes the
model and changes the interpretation of the interaction term as a simple slope of turnout on
NeighborGroupp[i] for Groupi.
In all models, we also include individual level controls for age, age squared and marital
status and cluster standard errors at the property level. In gauging gender-specific neighbor
effects, we fit the equation above separately for women and men. If working-class women
respond to class composition of their neighbors, we expect that working-class women’s proba-
bility to vote compared to all other women in the same property increases with the proportion
of workers among their neighbors.
Results
In this section, we estimate whether the proportion of one’s in-group neighbors affects one’s
likelihood to vote. Figure 3 below depicts point estimates of the interaction term between
one’s class and class composition of one’s neighbors   that indicates the average neighbor
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effects for each class. Sub-figure a) identifies whether worker’s probability to vote increases
with the proportion of workers among their neighbors and sub-figure b) identifies whether
upper and middle-class electors are more likely to vote as the proportion of upper and
middle-class neighbors increases. In order to gauge gender-specific effects, we also fit each
model separately for women (gray) and men (black). Full models are reported in Tables A9
and A10. The first three models in Figure 3a show that workers are more likely to vote if
surrounded by working-class neighbors. The effects are statistically significant at 5% level
or less in all three sampled elections. However, a very different picture emerges once we
examine neighbor effects separately for women and men.
The middle set of models in Figure 3a shows that working-class women are more likely
to vote if surrounded by working-class neighbors than mixed-class neighbors. The point
estimates are comparable or slightly larger than the overall neighbor effects and again sta-
tistically significant at 5% or less. The models suggest that one standard deviation (approx-
imately 43) increase in the proportion of workers among neighbors in a property increases
the probability of women workers to vote by 9.1, 9.2 and 12.1 percentage points in the
three elections respectively. These are sizable effects of comparable size to other individual
level determinants of turnout. As we show in the full results reported in Table A9, married
working class women were about 14.7, 13.6 and 3.9 percentage points more likely to vote
than single working-class women in the three elections respectively. In turn, one standard
deviation (approximately 15) increase in age increases the probability of women workers to
vote by about 6.1, 4.7 and 3.1 percentage points in the three elections respectively when age
is set at its mean. These effects lessen with increasing age.
The third set of models in Figure 3a shows that neighbor effects are not observed for men
workers. All three coefficients are close to zero or half-sized and far from being statistically
significant at conventional levels. The overall neighbor effects for workers are therefore driven
by women, which is consistent with our argument that working-class women were especially
responsive to ‘where they lived’ by forging politicized networks with their neighbors to a
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greater extent than working-class men who tended to have more opportunities to forge
politicized ties outside the home via employment, unions or other associations.
Figure 3b shows that upper and middle-class women and men also did not respond to
‘where they lived.’ Neither of the three sets of coefficients in Figure 3b shows large or
statistically significant estimates for upper and middle-class electors. This is consistent with
our argument that upper and middle-class electors had more opportunities and resources
to forge politicized networks outside the home - such as through outside employment or
voluntary associations.
Next, we probe our expectation that gender-class composition - in contrast to class alone
- does not matter for the mobilization of working class women (Figure A5). Indeed, while
working class women respond to how many other workers (men and women) live nearby
(Figure 3 above), they do not respond as strongly to how many other women workers are
among their neighbors. In 1921, the estimated average neighbor effects that consider both
gender and class composition are smaller in magnitude and imprecisely estimated. In 1934,
the estimated average neighbor effects are of similar size and significance. This is consistent
with our theoretical framework where working class women adopted a shared politicized
identity of workers - perhaps through secondary politicization via male neighbors and family
members - not of working-class women. By 1934, working-class women’s participation in
unions and women’s party clubs would have increased, plausibly enhancing working-class
women’s group consciousness as both workers and women.
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Figure 3: Average Neighbor Effects By Class and Gender
(a) Working-class (b) Upper and middle-class
Notes: Linear probability models; all models include controls for age, age squared, mar-
ried and a constant; coefficients in gray refer to models for women, black for men, red for
both women and men; dependent variable is a binary indicator of turnout among eligibles;
standard errors clustered at the property level; ‘M21/M34’ denotes municipal elections in
1921/1934, ‘C21’ denotes county elections in 1921; 95% CIs.
In the Appendix, we report full results for several sensitivity and robustness analyses.
First, we address potential issues raised by missing values for most women’s occupations. We
plot the proportion of one’s in-group neighbors among electors with a known class (our inde-
pendent variable) on the proportion of dependents and widows among all of one’s neighbors
and show that there is no correlation between the two (Figure A12). Given that we do not
know class of electors classified as dependents, the lack of a clear relationship is reassuring
against a potential bias caused by missing values. We then run the main model for working
class women separately for married and unmarried women (Figure A11). This addresses the
issue of missing values on women’s occupation in two additional ways: (i) if assigning class to
married women based on their husbands’ occupation introduces too much noise, we should
observe effects only among single women and (ii) if not assigning class to women dependents
(largely widows) drives the main results, we should also observe effects only among single
women. However, we do not observe systematic differences between the two sub-samples
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by marital status. This provides further reassurance that our main result is not driven by
missing data on women’s occupation.
Second, we show that the main result is robust to an alternative measure of class com-
position of neighbors as a proportion of known in-group neighbors out of all electors living
in the property, that is out of electors with both known and unknown class (Figure A6).
Third, we show that the main result is robust to excluding families with more than one
wife (Figure A8). This is a conservative test to ensure that our results are not driven by
erroneously classifying neighbors with the same last name as related. Fourth, we show that
the main result for upper and middle class remains unaltered when we run models only for
middle class (Figure A7). Fifth, we probe robustness of the main result to excluding one
of the seven neighborhoods at the time (Figure A10). The results are comparable across
all models, suggesting that our effects for working-class women are not driven by a single
neighborhood. Sixth, we show that logistic regression returns comparable results (Figure
A13).
Mechanisms
In the theory section, we refer to two mechanisms behind ‘neighbor effects’ for groups that
have motivation, need and opportunities to forge local ties: political conformity and political
information. The extent to which each drives the observed effects is hard to disentangle. For
example, well-networked individuals may both be compelled to conform to social norms, but
also have better access to information. We nonetheless explore the most direct implications
of each mechanism.
Political conformity One way to identify whether working-class women were more
likely to mobilize if surrounded by working-class neighbors because of increased conformity
is to exploit variation in the length of residence among electors. We expect those who live
longer in the same property to be more likely to develop stronger ties with neighbors of the
same class, which should increase their identification with and social pressure to local norms.
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To this end, we take advantage of the time span in our data and identify age-eligible electors
in 1934 who were also registered in 1921.
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About 29% of age eligible electors in 1934 could
be matched into the same neighborhood in both election years.
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Exploiting this data, we
fit the main result for working-class women in the 1934 election separately for women who
appeared on the electoral registers in 1921 and for those who would have been eligible to vote
in 1921 but were not matched (Figure 4a). Given the uneven size of the two sub-samples, the
resulting estimates have wide confidence intervals, which prevent us to derive statistically
meaningful conclusions. The point estimates are nonetheless larger in size for working-class
women who remained in the same neighborhood for at least 13 years, which is consistent
with the proposed mechanism.
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We match electors based on year of birth, name and neighborhood. While matching
individuals based on the same neighborhood rather than property - which is not possible
given data limitations - introduces noise, it seems reasonable to assume that those who
remain in the same neighborhood will be more likely to remain in the same property.
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The relatively low number of matched electors likely reflects: high mobility due to in-
ternal migration and emigration (Nordström 1968, p.779-842) and the fact that electors in
1934 below 35 years would not have been eligible to vote in 1921.
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Figure 4: Mechanisms
(a) Conformity (b) Information
Notes: Linear probability models; all models include controls for age, age squared, married
and a constant; standard errors clustered at the property level; all models fitted for working-
class women in the 1934 election; sub-figure a splits the sample by length of residence; sub-
figure b splits the sample by whether one lived in a property with a member of a Women’s
Social Democratic Club; 95% CIs.
Political information One way to identify whether working-class women were respon-
sive to class composition of their neighbors due to a better information from local opinion
leaders and canvassers is to exploit variation in the ‘type’ of one’s neighbors. We expect
those who live in class homogeneous properties with a politicized member to be more likely
to obtain political information. To this end, we take advantage of the fact that socialist
women in Södertälje were organized in a women’s wing of the Swedish Social Democratic
Party. The membership records of Södertälje Women’s Social Democratic Club indicate
304 entries between 1917-1932. Out of the 304 entries, we match 81 women to Södertälje
East
30
and 18 with individual women in Södertälje East in the 1934 electoral register.
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As
we would expect, working-class women living in a property with a member of the Women’s
30
Another 106 women are matched to Södertälje West (35%), and another 117 (38%)
entries could not be matched to either district. These mostly consist of entries with illegible
or partial addresses.
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Out of the 81 women matched to Södertälje East, we therefore identify 18 individual
members in the 1934 register. This is because (i) some members only appear in the 1921
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Social Democratic Club were almost twice as likely to vote in the 1934 election than other
working-class women. We then fit the main result for working-class women in the 1934
election separately for those who lived in a property with a member and those who did not
(Figure 4b).
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Given the uneven size of the two sub-samples that widens confidence intervals
around the estimates, we cannot derive statistically meaningful conclusions. The point esti-
mates of neighbor effects are nonetheless larger in size for working-class women who lived in
properties with a woman party member, which is consistent with the proposed mechanism.
Alternative Mechanisms
Were working-class women responsive because they were new voters? Given
that new voters lack experience with political process, they may be particularly susceptible
to ‘soak’ in the influence of their most immediate surroundings. The responsiveness of
working-class women to class composition of their neighbors may therefore reflect working-
class women’s ‘new’ status as voters, rather than their access to politicized local networks.
This explanations, however, is at odds with the fact that working-class women were still
responsive to class composition of their neighbors in the 1934 election, which is a sixth
election since women’s equal admittance to a local ballot box in 1919, and an election where
we no longer observe a sizable gender turnout gap. In addition, the estimated effects of
class composition of one’s neighbors are not smaller in 1934 than in 1921, which is also
at odds with this alternative explanation. It therefore seems unlikely that it would affect
only working-class women who would not have learned anything in six election years, even
though, by then, they would have voted at a similar level as men. We nonetheless probe this
possibility by splitting our sample by new voting status: ‘new’ electors who came to voting
register, and (ii) some addresses did not allow match with individual women. About 441
(8.8%) of age-eligible electors in 1934 lived in a property with at least one identified member.
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Only about 8% (N=80) of long-term residents in 1934 lived in a property with a member.
Each sub-figure of Figure 4 thus identifies largely separate populations.
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time in the 1934 election and all other ‘established’ electors (Figure
A14). While we find that ‘new’ voters of all social groups indeed tend to be more responsive
to class composition than ‘established’ voters, only working-class women are responsive to
neighbor context among the established electors. Overall, this suggests that while new voters
indeed respond more to ‘where they live’, this cannot explain why working-class women were
more responsive to class composition than all other social groups, including upper & middle
class women who also mostly voted for the first time in 1919.
We working-class women responsive because they were domestic servants?
While our theory predicts that domestic workers would have been especially unlikely to vote
given that most of them resided in upper and middle-class properties, and were therefore
most isolated from in-group politicized networks, it seems important to assess whether our
findings can be driven entirely by domestic servants. However, the average neighbor effects
are similar in size and precision level regardless of whether we include or exclude women
domestic servants (Figure A15a). Even though most women domestic servants were single,
it may still be that some married women were employed as domestic servants, but we cannot
exclude these women from the data set for missing occupation of married women. However,
further restricting the data set to single women, for which we have information on occupation,
the coefficients for all three municipal elections are positive, larger in size size, and significant
at 5% level in two of the three elections (Figure A15a). Overall, these two tests provide
evidence that is consistent with the explanation that our result is not driven by domestic
servants.
Were working-class women responsive because of pressure by employers? An-
other possibility is that women were more vulnerable to employers’ pressure, especially in
large working-class apartment buildings, perhaps because of weaker unionization. To probe
this possibility, we identify women whose occupation is listed as ‘factory worker’ and who
should therefore be most vulnerable to employer’s pressure. However, the average neighbor
effects are similar in size and precision level regardless of whether we include or exclude
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women factory workers (Figure A15b). Even though most women factory workers were sin-
gle, it may still be that some married women worked in factories, but we cannot exclude
these women from the data set for missing occupation of married women. However, further
restricting the data set to single women, for which we have information on occupations, the
coefficients for municipal elections in 1934 and 1921 are positive and of similar size (Figure
A15b). The effects for county elections in 1921 are smaller in size and imprecisely estimated.
Overall, these two tests provide evidence that is consistent with the explanation our result
is unlikely to be explained by working-class women’s disproportionate employer pressure in
the largely working class properties.
Were working-class women responsive because their husbands voted for them?
While voting by proxy has been abolished in 1919, married couples continued being allowed
to vote by proxy (Sjögren 2012). This raises a concern that married women’s votes may
have been ‘hidden’ second votes of their husbands. We therefore pay special attention to the
possibility that the main result is driven by working-class husbands, but find no indication
in the data that proxy voting has been utilized by working-class husbands in a systematic
way. First, if marital proxy voting explained our main finding, we would observe neighbor
effects only among married women, which is not the case (Figure A11). Second, if most votes
of married women were ‘hidden’ votes of their husbands, we would expect marital status to
impact women’s turnout, especially working-class women’s, to a greater degree than men’s,
which is also not the case (Table A11).
Beyond Södertälje
One remaining question is to what extent our results from Södertälje can tells us something
general about the mobilization of early women voters. In this section, we therefore discuss
the generalizability of our findings to other cities and rural localities in Sweden. To this




Sveringes Officiella Statistik, Riksdagsmannavalen aren 1925-1928. Stockholm, 1928.
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municipality-level turnout for each social group (women of all classes and men of all classes)
by municipality-level proportion of workers and returns results that are consistent with our
findings.
34
This data provides ecological evidence that our findings from Södertälje are
generalizable across all urban municipalities in Sweden (Figure 5a) and can provide insights
into the generalizability of our findings beyond the urban settings (Figure 5b).
Figure 5a shows that turnout of working-class women is higher in municipalities with
greater proportion of workers in cities. While only about 55% of working-class women voted
in cities where workers were in a minority, over 65% of working-class women voted in cities
where workers were in a majority. In turn, the relevant difference in men’s turnout between
the two types of municipalities is only few percentage points. Importantly, neither upper-
class women nor upper-class men responded to class composition of their cities. This provides
ecological evidence for our argument that, unlike privileged classes and working-class men,
urban working-class women mobilized through local networks.
Figure 5b shows that while turnout of all social groups responds to class composition
of municipalities in a rural setting, these relationships are always stronger for women and
especially noticeable for working-class women. That is, while turnout of both working-
class women and men was higher in rural municipalities with greater proportion of workers,
this was especially the case for working-class women. Similarly, while turnout of upper-class
women and men was higher in rural municipalities with fewer workers, this was especially the
case for upper-class women. This is consistent with our argument that when opportunities
to forge politicized networks outside of one’s most immediate surroundings are more limited
- in this case through agricultural character of rural economies - local networks provide vital
resources to all social groups. This is also consistent with our argument that working-class
- and possibly upper-class rural - women relied on local networks to a greater extent than
men of their class, reflecting greater opportunities and need to form local social ties.
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Given that the raw data were not retained, we can only report the final analysis as it is
compiled in the census.
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Notes: Proportion of workers in a municipality on the x-axis, turnout of each class on the y-
axis; numbers displayed in the graphs refer to gender turnout gap (percentage point difference




Scholars emphasize that limited electoral participation of the most underprivileged groups
bears weak political representation (APSA Task Force 2004; Barreto 2018). If social inequal-
ities drive electoral inequalities that in turn limit representation of marginalized groups, we
have to better understand the pathways to mobilization of the most underprivileged groups.
A thorough examination of working-class women among newly enfranchised voters provides a
unique opportunity to enrich our understanding of how did the most underprivileged groups
gain de facto access to the polls upon de jure access to politics. Through the study of early
working-class women voters, this paper uncovers one such pathway: local networks.
Despite the troubling social and economic implications of geographic segregation of
marginalized groups, this paper demonstrates how living close to ‘those alike’ may em-
power electorally those whose access to politically relevant resources is limited the most. In
many ways, local networks may act as an ‘alternative’ resource available to newly enfran-
chised groups when access to traditional political resources through education or outside
employment is limited. At the turn of the twentieth century, women were institutionally
and culturally incentivized to leave employment upon marriage, while non-unionized, ca-
sual, unremunerated or domestic-based jobs were mostly available to married women in
economic need. While this limited opportunities of the most underprivileged women to de-
velop civic skills, the increased social and economic ‘presence’ of working-class women in the
local community did not necessarily impede their mobilization, it became their pathway to
vital resources - at least until better paying careers outside their local community became
available.
Future research may assess the extent to which successful mobilization of working-class
women after suffrage not only helped to close the gender turnout gap, but also improved
lives of working-class women. Quick glance at the history of social reform laws that made
significant advancements in health and social security of the most vulnerable mothers and
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their children suggests that the adoption of these laws often coincided with the introduction
of working-class women into the electorate (e.g. Paterson 2018 on Norway; Skocpol 1995 on
U.S.).
Future research should also explore the extent to which social composition of one’s neigh-
bors promotes women’s mobilization in contemporary settings. While the level and character
of women’s labour force are by no means similar to what they were a century ago, women’s
labour force participation continues to lag behind men’s. Western women continue being
more likely to take part-time jobs, work fewer hours, enter different types of jobs, commute
shorted distances and take longer family leaves (Crane 2007; Lewis, Campbell and Huerta
2008). The extent to which these differences are strong enough to warrant a class-specific
pathway to women’s mobilization remains to be determined.
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